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BOOK REVIEW 
INCENTIVES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION. 
Edited by Thomas C. Shelling. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1983, 
pp.355. 
Reviewed by Craig E. Reese* 
This book is the fifth in the MIT Press series on the regulation 
of economic activity, the general editor of which is Richard 
Schmalensee of the MIT Sloan School of Management. Previous 
books in the series have dealt with the regulation of freight 
transport, the SEC, oil price controls, and case studies on public 
regulation by social scientists sympathetic with the philosophy of 
the "Chicago School of Economics." As Schmalensee explains in 
the preface, the purpose of this MIT series "is to inform the 
ongoing debate on regulatory policy by making significant and 
relevant research available to both scholars and decision mak-
ers." More specifically, three extensive case studies are used in 
this book as a vehicle for exploring the degree to which economic 
disincentives, such as emission or effluent charges,! can be used 
as an alternative to regulation in the implementation of environ-
mental protection policy. 
Political economists have traditionally argued that public 
policy-makers can control social behavior through three ap-
proaches: regulation (including prohibition), subsidization, and 
taxation (tax or fee on pollution). None of the three is theoretically 
* Professor, Department of Accounting and Economics, School of Business Adminis-
tration, Pan American University; BA, University of Texas; MBA, St. Mary's (San 
Antonio); Ph.D., University of Texas (Austin). 
I Emission or effluent charges are fees or taxes exacted by the government from 
natural (individuals) and legal (institutions) persons who pollute the air, water and land. 
Such exactions are a surrogate for the price society would charge for the use of clean air, 
clean water and unspoiled land. 
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more efficient than the other two.2 However, federal legislation to 
control pollution is classified by political economists as regulation. 
Examples of legislative regulation include the federal Clean Air 
Act and the various federal water pollution control acts. Much of 
the remaining federal pollution control legislation is classified as 
subsidization. Federal grants for the construction of municipal 
sewage treatment facilities, the rapid amortization of pollution 
control facilities, the investment tax credit, and industrial devel-
opment bonds fall within the subsidization category. Finally, 
there has been little, if any, reliance on taxation as a means of 
pollution control in the United States. Some examples are found 
at the state level, including beverage container (litter) taxes in 
Oregon, Vermont, Maine, and Michigan; at the federal level, there 
is the Superfund exaction on chemicals and petroleum. 
The federal government relies primarily on the regulatory pro-
cess with limited subsidization as the means for controlling pollu-
tion. Nonetheless, some political economists continue to propose 
the use of other means of social control, notably, taxation, as 
complements or alternatives to the regulatory process. The pro-
ponents of alternatives to regulation often argue for taxation be-
cause effluent or emission charges are alleged to be more efficient 
than regulation in practice. Based on economic theory, the 
superiority of the taxation method of social control can be demon-
strated only where suboptimal implementation is assumed. Sub-
optimal implementation occurs when the total private cost of 
reducing pollution exceeds society's economic benefits. This 
cost-benefit approach is illustrated when, for example, govern-
ment imposes uniform regulatory standards that do not reflect 
each entity's marginal cost of pollution control. Unfortunately, 
few empirical studies have been conducted demonstrating the 
superiority in practice of anyone of the three methods of social 
control. Undoubtedly, this fact explains the paucity of references 
to empirical research in the three in-depth case studies presented 
in Schelling's book. 
In the last few years, the public's apparent dissatisfaction with 
high taxes has precipitated a tax revolt in California (Proposition 
13) and in other states and cities. The public's antitax mood has 
not been reflected, however, in its attitude toward the use of 
taxation to control pollution. In early 1978, a national survey of 
2 See w. BAUMOL and W. OATES, THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POlJCY (1975) for an 
excellent commentary on the efficiency of the three social control methods. 
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attitudes toward using taxes to encourage more "socially respon-
sible" behavior suggested popular support. Of those surveyed who 
were eighteen years or older, eighty-two percent favored a federal 
tax system wherein companies that do not comply with some 
preconceived effluent of emission standards should pay higher 
taxes than those firms that do comply with such standards for 
water and air quality.3 
The book's first chapter, which is entitled "Prices as Regulatory 
Instruments" and written by the editor Thomas C. Schelling, is an 
explanation of the economic theory of pollution charges (taxation) 
and pollution permits that fix the overall amount of allowable 
emissions (marketable rights approach). The three case studies 
which follow deal with the regulation of aircraft noise, the regula-
tion of airborne benzene, and the regulation of air pollution under 
the Clean Air Act.4 The final chapter, which is entitled "Economic 
Incentives and Environmental Policy: Politics, Ideology and Phi-
losophy," is an analysis of the political economy of incentive-based 
approaches. This analysis relies heavily on a 1978 survey con-
ducted by the author Steven Kelman on the attitudes of selected 
congressional staff members and Washington lobbyists (for envi-
ronmental groups and trade associations) toward the use of eco-
nomic incentives for controlling pollution. 
The first case study, written by David Harrison, Jr., begins with 
a chapter on the problem of aircraft noise pollution. The next two 
chapters describe the federal government's approach to the con-
trol of aircraft noise (Chapter 3) and noise control strategies for 
specific airports (Chapter 4), especially those proposed for Bos-
ton's Logan Airport. Both chapters include extensive cost-benefit 
analyses. 
The final chapter of the noise pollution case study is an evalua-
tion of incentive-based strategies for controlling aircraft noise 
pollution. In his evaluation, Harrison explains several conclusions 
derived from his analysis of the previous three chapters of the 
case study. His explanation stresses the utility of economic-incen-
tive schemes in general, while recognizing that the theoretical 
(cost-benefit) analysis of such schemes should include disclosure of 
administrative obstacles thereto, as well as philosophical and 
ethical considerations implicit in using economic incentives to 
control pollution. 
3 Perspectives on Current Developments: Should Polluters Pay, REGULATION 14 
(July-Aug. 1978). 
4 42 u.s.c. §§ 1857-1859f (1982). 
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The second case study, which begins with an overview (Chapter 
6) of the problem of benzene air pollution, actually serves as an 
illustration of the general problem of regulating hazardous air 
pollutants. The Clean Air Act's provisions applicable to such 
public-health air pollution hazards have been controversial and 
the subject of much litigation because of the stringent and costly 
regulations applicable to any substance classified by the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) as a hazardous air pollutant. 
In the overview, the author Albert L. Nichols proposes that one 
or more of the following three economic incentives be im-
plemented as a complement to what is now exclusively a 
regulatory-based scheme for controlling hazardous air pollutants: 
pollution charges (taxation), marketable rights to pollute (pollu-
tion permits), and subsidies. 
In the second chapter (Chapter 7) of his benzene case study, 
Nichols describes several models used to estimate damage func-
tions for various ambient levels of benzene air pollution and 
analyzes the implications of various cost-based incentive schemes. 
For the most part, he overlooks the uncertainties associated with 
anyone model for estimating damages from human exposure to 
benzene. The third chapter (Chapter 9) is a thorough study of the 
maleic anhydride industry, including a cost-benefit analysis of the 
EPA's proposed benzene regulations and an analysis of alterna-
tive economic-based incentives on the benzene emissions by that 
industry. In the final chapter of the benzene case study, Nichols 
argues for the use of exposure charges rather than regulations in 
reducing benzene emissions and the level of ambient benzene 
concentrations. He relies heavily on his study (Chapter 9) of the 
use of a charge scheme for benzene emissions to demonstrate that 
a charge scheme is more cost-effective than regulations. 
The third and final case study, which was written by Robert 
Repetto, begins with an overview (Chapter 10) of the prevention-
of-significant-deterioration (PSD) air pollution control regulations 
and the economic efficiency implications thereof. The second 
chapter (Chapter 11) in the Clean Air Act case study is a summary 
of the criticisms of and alternatives to the PSD regulations. The 
third chapter (Chapter 12) is an evaluation of the performance of 
the alternatives to PSD regulations, including economic-based 
incentives such as the offset system,5 bubble concept6 and emis-
5 The "offset system" is an EPA policy designed to permit an industrial plant to locate 
in an area which does not meet federal air quality standards if that plant's owners can 
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sion charge schemes. In the final chapter of the case study, Re-
petto places the PSD regulations in the context of the broader 
goals of economic efficiency and concludes that PSD policies 
should be varied from region to region to reflect the unique air-
quality values being protected therein and the probable attri-
butes of future emissions growth in each region. 
The final chapter of the book is perhaps the most interesting to 
political economists. It analyzes the reasons for the unpopularity 
of economic-incentive approaches among congressional staff 
members associated with environmental committees, environ-
mentalists, and industry lobbyists. The attitudes of these envi-
ronmental policy-makers, at a time when deregulation and mar-
ket solutions to public policy problems have grown so popular, 
cannot be explained by a lack of literature on the theoretical 
advantages of economic-based incentives for pollution control. 
One need only look at the extensive ten page bibliography at the 
end of Schelling's book which indicates a wealth of economic 
literature on the use of economic incentives to control pollution. 
As noted, opinion polls also indicate that the public supports 
taxation as a means of pollution control. While the results of 
Kelman's survey indicate widespread awareness of the alterna-
tive of economic incentives for pollution abatement among con-
gressional staff-members and environmentalists, these policy-
makers are nonetheless ideologically and philosophically opposed 
to economic-based incentives because 1) pollution charges and 
marketable rights represent a "license to pollute" and 2) a mone-
tary price cannot be placed on health or the environment. Ironi-
cally, industry lobbyists as a group were woefully uninformed 
about incentive-based approaches for controlling pollution. In ad-
dition, they expressed a concern that pollution control costs were 
already too high and that economic-based incentives would only 
increase costs by creating a new source of revenue for the gov-
ernment. Kelman closes with his suggestions for a political strat-
egy that could result in the realization of specific statutory au-
ensure that an existing plant in the, area will reduce its pollution by more than the 
amount the new industrial source will emit. 
6 The "bubble concept" is an EPA policy which permits an industrial complex emitting 
the same air pollutant from several sources therein to be treated as a single source of 
that pollutant, i.e., the entire complex is treated as a "bubble" of air pollution. As a 
result, the industrial polluter may abate its overall emission of that pollutant in a 
cost-effective manner by utilizing the least-cost abatement technologies so that an 
overall standard (rather than a standard for each source) for the polluting substance is 
satisfied. 
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thority for pollution charges and other economic-based incentives 
for pollution abatement when Congress reenacts pollution control 
laws. Because both the Clean Air Act7 and the Water Pollution 
Control Actt! are expected to be reenacted in 1985, knowing why 
those who influence federal environmental policy are reticent to 
support economic incentives should be helpful to congressional 
supporters of deregulation and economic-based solutions to public 
policy problems. 
No doubt Schelling's book would be a valuable addition to the 
library of economists' and political scientists with an interest in 
environmental affairs. Schelling's book would also be excellent for 
a graduate course in environmental economics or a graduate 
course on public policy and environmental protection. In addition, 
environmentalists in the teaching profession, government and 
industry should recognize the book as an excellent collection of 
theory and applications. Finally, the subjects of Kelman's survey, 
including congressional staffers associated with environmental 
committees, environmental group lobbyists, industrial lobbyists, 
and similar groups at the state level of government, might also 
benefit by adding this book to their shelves. Although reading the 
book may not change their minds, it is always helpful to under-
stand how the opposition thinks. 
7 Supra note 4. 
• 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982). 
